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In the Supreme Court
of the
State of Utah
STANTON TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY, a corporation,
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PlaintiJff,

CONTINENTAL
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COThi-

p ANY, a division of YOUNGSTOWN (

SHEET AND TUBE CO:MP ANY, a
corporation,
Plaintiff, Respondent
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I

Case No. 8950

-vs.-

MARVIN DAVIS, JACK DAVIS,
JEAN DAVIS and JOAN PRESTON, partners, doing business under
the firm name of DAVIS OIL COMPANY,
Defendants, Appellants
and Cross Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT and CROSS APPELLANT,
CONTINENTAL EMSCO COMANY, a division of
YOUNGSTOWN SHEET AND TUBE COMPANY
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be designated in this brief as follows: Appellant Stanton Transportation Company, as
"Stanton"; Plaintiff, Respondent and Cross Appellant
Continental Emsco Company, a division of Youngstown
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Sheet and Tube Company, as "Emsco"; and defendants,
Appellants and Respondents, Marvin Davis, Jack Davis,
Jean Davis, Joan Preston, partners, doing business under
the firm name of Davis Oil Company, as "Davis." The
Walker-Wilson Drilling Company will sometimes be referred to herein as "Walker-Wilson" or as "Driller."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This brief contains an answer to the brief filed herein in the appeal of Davis from the judgment of the trial
court holding that Emsco is entitled to a Jiechanics' Lien
in the amount of $4,158.64 for rock-drilling bits furnished
hy Emsco to tlie Driller and also is a cross appeal by
Emsco from the judgment of the trial court holding that
Emsco was not entitled to a lien for 1naterials furnished
other than the rock drilling bits above referred to having
a value of $2,620.10.
STATEMENT OF F ...-\_CTS
References to the Clerk's files and transcripts of the
hearings will be designated herein in the sruue manner as
in the brief of Davis.
With respect to the appeal of Davis against the judgInent in favor of En1sco for the rock drilling bits, Emsco
does not controvert DaYis · Staten1ent of facts except the
following state1nent:
"'The rock bits did not bec01ue part of the improveinent of well and the clai1u of En1sco is only
for the service given by tl1e rented bits." (Page
5 of Davis' brief).
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3
E1nsco contend that the statement of facts by Davi~
with respect to the part played by the rock bits in the
drilling operations, including the extent to which they
became a part of the well, and the terms under which
they were furnished is incomplete, and that the following
facts also appear from the record:
In the process of drilling an oil and gas well, it is
the rock bit which actually does the drilling, that is, the
teeth of the bit cut the hole as it rotates at the end of the
drill stem. ( T R A pp. 67-68).
Under the terms of the agreement under which the
bits were furnished in this case, the driller had the right
to use the bits until they had served their useful like as
instruments of drilling, that is, until the cutter teeth
were worn away or they became "dull." (Emsco's Exhibits A(A); B through F; A-4; A-9; A-12; A-13; A-16;
A-17; TRAp. 71).
The charge for the rock drilling bits, upon which the
lien claim of Emsco is based, is for the bit and the promise of the customer to return the same after it becomes
dull and the customer is through with it. ( TRA p. 71)
The bits for which Emsco claims a lien were actually
used in the making or drilling the oil and gas well in
question. ('TRA pp. 67-74; Emsco's Exhibits A(A), B
thru F, B-1). The claim of Emsco is for the service of th1-~
bits furnished in making the hole which included a consumption or wearing away of the teeth of the bits ( TRA
pp. 63-64) and the value of this use of the bits was
$4,158.64 (TRB pp. 106-107; Emsco's Exhibits A-4; A-9;
A-12; A-13; A-16; A-17; B through F; A(A) and 0),
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which sum is consistent with the usual consumption of
bits in the drilling of a well to the depth involved here.
(TRB pp. 108-109).
In view of the point relied on in the Davis Brief,
Emsco also questions the materiality of the staten1ent
in that brief that: "Walker-Wilson did not complete
their drilling contract, and Davis had to go in and complete the work. Davis suffered damages running into
several thousand dollars over and above the contract
price." (Davis' brief pp. 5 and 6).
With respect to the Cross appeal of Emsco against
Davis, for the sake of brevity, Emsco hereby incorporates
herein, the statement of facts set forth in the brief of
Stanton. (Case No. 8951). In addition, the record shmYs
the following facts:
Pursuant to the contract of Dece1nber 9, 1956, between Walker-\Yilson Drilling Con1pany and Davis to
drill the well in question, Walker-\Yilson established a
line of credit whereby Emsco agreed to furnish \YalkerWilson Drilling Company such 1naterials on a credit basis
as 1night be needed to drill said well. (TR~\_ pp. 40-43).
Pursuant to the establislnnent of this line of credit
and during the time said well ,,~as being drilled, En1sco
furnished 1naterials to the \Yalker-\Yilson Drilling Company from their store in Fannington, X ew :Jiexico. These
materials can be divided into two classifications: First,
rock drilling bits "·hieh are referred to above and, second,
materials, such as parts for the drilling rig, n1ore particu]arly identified b~T Eu1sco's exhibits A-5, R, Y. I, A-23.
A-19, H, A-18, A-10, A-15, G, A-11, A-20, A-1±, A-22, .A-21,
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N, Y, P, A-24, X, W, J, A-7, Q, T, S, U, A-8, K, A-6, L,
A-2, Z, A-1, A-3 and M, and which materials are adapted
to, required, and are expendable in the operation of the
drilling rig. ( TRA pp. 83-91, TRB pp. 25-26).
It is the ite1ns in the second classification which are
the subject matter of this cross appeal of Emsco. With
reference to these items, some of the materials, valued
in the sum of $371.62, were delivered by Emsco to employees of the Driller working at the well in question at
Emsco's store in Farmington, New Mexico (Emsco's
Exhibits Q; R; S; Counter Order Slip No. 278192, a
part of Emsco's Exhibit I; Counter Order Slips Nos.
278191 and 278251, parts of Emsco's Exhibit K). Some
of these materials, having a value of $1,082.81, were delivered at Cortez, Colorado, to Mr. F. L. Wilson, the tool
pusher or foreman of the Driller on the rig drilling the
well in question. (Counter Order Slips Nos. 388334, 338188, 156476, parts of Emsco's Exhibit G; Counter Order
Slips Nos. 388479 and 388372, parts of Emsco's Exhibit
H; Counter Order Slips Nos. 388090 and 388165, parts
of Emsco's Exhibit K; Counter Order Slips Nos. 388201,
388460, 388462 and 388436, parts of Emsco's Exhibit N;
Emsco's Exhibit A-18; A-10; A-15; A-23; A-19; A-7; A-8;
A-ll; A-14; A-22; A-21; TRB pp. 28-29, 32-36, 42-44.
The balance of these items, having a value in the sum of
$1,155.77, were delivered to the location of the well in
San Juan 'County, State of Utah, by Ems co. (Counter
Order Slips Nos. 388056 and 278357, parts of Emsco's
Exhibits I; Counter Order Slips Nos. 278460, 278412, and
278353, parts of Emsco 's Exhibit K; Counter Order Slip
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No. 164012, a part of Emsco's Exhibit L; ·Counter Order
Slips Nos. 278494, 278492, 278493 and 278495, parts of
Emsco's Exhibit M; Emsco's Exhibits A-5; V; Y; P; W;
T; U; A-6; Z; A-1 through A-3; TRB pp. 37-43).

ARGUMENT
IN ANSWER TO DAVIS' POINT NO. 1, ONE WHO FURNISHES ROCK DRILLING BITS USED IN THE DRILLING
OF AN OIL WELL IS ENTITLED TO A LIEN ON SAID
WELL UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION .38-1-3,
(UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953) FOR THE REASONABLE
VALUE OF THE USE OF SAID BITS.

It appears to be the contention of Davis that the
word "material" as used in Section 38-1-3, ""CCA, 1953,
does not e1nbrace the rock drilling bits furnished by Emsco under the facts of this case.
In common usage the word material has been defined
as
"The apparatus or imple1uents necessary to
the doing of anything."
as well as
"The substance or substances, or the parts,
goods, stock, or the like, of which anything is composed or n1ay be made." ('Yebster's ~ ew International Dietimuu~·. Second Edition, P. 1514.)
Thus we see there is nothing inherent in the word
''material" which excludes iten1s which are used in the
drilling of an oil or gas well even though they do not beconle a pennanent attaehment to the well. The ultimate
question then, is whether or not the legislature intended
to give a lien for the use of the iten1s such as the rock bits,
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which are used in the drilling of the well until they become dull, and thus have no further value as an instrument of drilling until the cutting teeth are replaced.
Admittedly the cases from the various states are not
uniform in their rulings with respect to the general question of the lienability of the rental value of equipment
furnished for use in drilling an oil and gas well. It is the
contention of Ems co that (a) the rule which allows the
lien is the better view and is more consistent with the
wording of the Utah Statute and (h) the terms under
which the bits involved here were furnished and the use
made of them is different from the ordinary lease situation, and even under the strictest view, the value of that
use is lienable.
The more liberal rule is set forth in l'Villiam JJJ.
Graham OiJl and Gas Company v. Oil Well Supply, 128
Okla., 201, 264 P. 591, wherein the Court said:
"One other item not listed above, contained
in the account of the Oil Well Supply Company, is
also challenged as being nonlienable. This is an
item of $8.75 in an account of $31,167.37, representing one day's rental of certain necessary drilling tools furnished to and used by lessees. Defendants in their attack thereon rely on the case of
Arkansas Fuel Co. v. McDowell, 119 Okla. 77, 249
P. 717, wherein it was held in paragraph 5 of the
syllabus, that 'One who rents 'fishing tools' to the
owner of an oil or gas lease, at a stipulated price
per day, for the use of such tools on a 'fishing job'
is not entitled to a lien for the rental value thereof,
under the sections 7464-7 466, Comp. St. 1921.'
"And where, in the body of the opinion in
reference to the principle announced, it was said:
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'With reference to the lien of the Acme Fishing
Tool Company, we are of opinion the court erred
in rendering judgment establishing a lien in its
favor. This company neither furnished labor nor
materials, but this was purely a rental contract of
certain tools with which to do a fishing job, and
does not fall within the purview of the statute.'
"We think that to be a restricted or lilnited
interpretation of the word 'furnish' used to express the legislative will, as there is no legislative
manifestation in the Statute indicating an intention that the term should be given an interpretation other than that of its ordinary meaning.'
Words used in any statute are to be understood
in their ordinary sense, except when a contrary
intention plainly appears, and except also that the
words hereinafter explained are to be understood
as thus explained.' Section 3528, C.O.S. 1921.
"The word 'furnish' is not one of the words
'hereinafter explained.' In its ordinary sense, the
term means to supply a thing for use in the accomplishment of a particular purpose. This may
be either by sale absolute or by hire at a specified
rate. The rental plan is not new to the oil industry
as is shown by the case relied on, and the case of
U. S. Supply Co. v. Andrews, 71 Okla. 293, 176 P.
967, referred to therein. The interpretation of the
law there made in that respect is inharmonious
with the broad application of the statute 1nade to
other phases of the case, and is not consonant with
the prior decisions of this Court where lien laws
were involved. To hold that statnte gi res to the
one a lien for commodities furnished 1ch ich become
a part of the prope1·ty, either by consumption in
the usc thereof, or by attachntent as a part of the
equipment or machinery or othenoise, and that it
denies to the other who likewi,se furnished com-
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modities equally as essentval and necessary as
furnished by the one, though srttch comnwdit.ies
furnished by the other be not consrttmed nor become a part of the properties developed by attachment, and retain ivndividuality, and be capable of
further use upon completion of the immediate purposes for whi·ch they were purchased, it is to say
that the lawmaking body of the state acted in a
most discriminatory manner in the enactment of
the statute, when it is known as a matter of common knowledge that a large quanti·ties of such
necessary .and essential conunoditiJes, never become a part of the leasehold either by consumption
or attachment thereto. In the language of Kansas
City Southern Ry Co. v. Wallace, supra; 'The
Legislature that would make a discrimination at
once so unjust and unreasonable would, in the very
act lay at its door an impeachment for besottedignorance or gross partiality.'
"We are unwilling to make this intiination.
In our view, therefore, we think the language of
the statute was answered when the challenged
items were furnished under the line of credit established by the agreement of the parties and employed in the development of the leaseholds involved, and to keep in repair the machinery and
equipment used in the operation thereof, we therefore conclude that the items in question are lienable. The case of Arkansas Fuel Company v. McDowell, supra, in so far as the same is in conflict
with the conclusions here reached upon this phase
of the cause at bar, is hereby expressly overruled." (Emphasis added).
(See also Standard Pipe and Supply Co. v. Red Rock
Co., 57 Cal. App. 2d 897, 135 P. 2d 659.)
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On the other hand, the 1nore restrictive view is set
forth in the Kansas cases of Wilkinson v. P.acifvc MidWest Oil Co., 152 Kan. 712, 107 P. 2d 726, which involved
the rental of well casing, and Bridgeport Machine Co. v.
M cKnab, 136 Kan. 781, 18 P. 2d 186, wherein the type
of tools rented is not set forth.
The other Kansas cases cited in the brief of Davis
do not in'lll 1 VE:~ the Eenability of rental at all, but of the
purchase price of equipment used in equipping a string
of tools· used in drilling the well (Jlarion Jlach. Co. v.
Allen, 119 Kan. 770, 2±1 P. 450), and of "miscellaneous
equipment of a drilling company used on this well today
and on another tomorrow, such as 'bull rope, belt, wrench,
hammer, water pail, sandline reel and drilling line.'"
(Given v. Campbell, 127 Kan. 378, 273 P. -1-!2.) The Court,
in these cases, considered that there was a lack of relationship between the benefit conferred on the particular
well and the an1ount of the lien cla.llned, as is evidenced
hy the following language from Gireu r. Campbel!, supra:
"Now, it is perfectly obvious that if tlris well
were drilled to cmnpletion, these articles would
not becmne fixtures of the leasehold. They \Yould
<"onstitute no part of the i1nprove1nent of tl1e P1'011PrtY. TheY will be carried awaY and used on a
sec.ond and third drilling job, and so on 1mtil they
are worn out. Should appellee's leasehold be subject to a lien for the paynwnt of this rope, belt,
wrench, hmnmer, pail, sand line. and drilling line?
If so, will plaintiffs' leasehold alone be subject to
a lien therefor, or will all the leaseholds in the
cmnmunity on which these chattels are successively used until they are worn out be likewise sub-
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jected to appellant's lien claiin for their payment?
Why should a vendor's lien be granted on an
interest in realty for the price of a wrench, a hanlmer, or a water pail purchased for the use of the
driller of an oil and gas well when no such lien
is granted for the purchase price of a carpenter's
hammer, a plumber's wrench, or a plasterer's
water pail similarly used in the construction of
any other improvement on realty~"

Fees v. Ritchey, 136 Kan. 221, lc1 P. 2d 652, involved
the question of rental of casing but does not decide the
issue of lienability because it holds that the person furnishing the pipe was paid by accepting an interest in
the well.
Bridgport Iv.Iachine Co. ?;. lllcKnab, supra, is the
decision which established the rule in Kansas that rent
for the use of tools used in an oil or gas well is not
lienable and that case cites as authority for that proposition Road Supply & Metal Co. v. Bechtelheimer, 119
Kan. 560, 240 P. 846, and Arkansas F1tel Oil Co. v.
McDowell, 119 Okla. 77, 249 P. 717.
The Arkansas Fuel O~l Co. case was and had been
overruled by the William M. Graham Oil ,and Gas Co.
case, referred to above, at the time the Bridgport case
was decided so that the only existing authority cited
therein is the Road Supply & Metal Co. case.

Thus the Kansas rule had its inception in the latter
decision which held that the rental of grading machinery,
tools and implements used in building a road were not
"material" because:
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"Material, within the meaning of our statute,
is that which enters into, becomes a part of, and
remains with the completed work." (Road Supply
& Metal Co. v. Bechtelhei1ner, supra, 119 Kan. at
page 563, 240 P. at page 847.)
Clayton v. Bridgeport ill ach. Co., Tex. Civ. App.,
33 S.vV. 2d 787, does contain some dicta to the effect that
the word "materials" under the Texas decisions does not
include the rental of tools. It defines "supply" as:
·• Available aggregate of things needed or demanded, * * * anything yielded or offered to meet
a want.''
The definition of "material" found in \Yebster's
Dictionary set forth above as •·the apparatus or implements necessary to the doing of anything" is not materially different from the definition of "supply" in the
Clayton Case.
Section 68-3-11,

(t:.C.~l.

1953), provides:

.. \Y ords and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the aproved usage of
the language~ but teclmieal words and phrases,
and such others as have acquired a peculiar and
appropriate 1neaning in law. or are defined by
statute, are to be construed according to such
peculiar and appropriate 1neaning or definition.''
(See Cache Auto Co. v. Centra! Garage, 63 Utah
10, 221 P. 862).
Frmn the foregoing it is apparent that there is
nothing in the "approved usage" of the word "1naterial"
which requires that it "enter into, become a part of, and
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rmnain with the completed work" as required under
the Kansas definition.
In fact, the "context" of the word "material" in the
Utah lien statute (Section 38-1-3, U.C.A., 1953) negatives
that requirement. The language of the statute with respect to the "furnishing" of "material to be used in the
construction or alteration of, or addition to, or repair of,
any ... iinprovements upon land" provides that the person so furnishing said materials shall have a lien "upon
the property" on which they have furnished the materials.
(Emphasis added.) Under this provision there may be
some merit to the contention that there must be a permanent attachment of the items for which a lien is
claimed. The items must be "used in" the "construction,''
etc. of the "improvement." Had our legislature intended
the restrictive meaning claimed by Davis and announced
in the Kansas cases, to be applied to oil and gas wells
in this state, it would have used this same language with
respect to an oil and gas well when making the 1933
amendment referred in the brief of Stanton in Case No.
8951. Instead, there is a complete absence of any requirement that the materials be "used in the construction or
alteration of, or addition to" the well. By the use of different language, a completely new standard or test is
substituted, so that the question is whether or not the
materials are "furnished for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any ... oil or gas well,"
not whether the materials were "used in the construction
of" or "additions to" the well. Who can doubt that
Emsco, in furnishing the rock bits which actually cut the
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hole or well here involved, furnished them for the "prospecting" and "development" of the well and actually contributed to the drilling or "prospecting" and "development" of the well, the value of the use of said bits in the
sum of $4,158.64. Is the bit any less furnished for the
prospecting and development of the well because it is
returned to Emsco after the cutter teeth have served their
useful life.
Further, it is submitted that even under- the Kansas
rule requiring permanent attachment by complete consumption of the items, the value of the use of the bits
is lienable. To the extent that a charge is made therefore,
the bits were consumed, that is, the teeth were worn
away. The bits become useless, until the teeth are replaced. This is not the usual rental situation where the
amount of the rent is based upon the time the equipment
is used. Here the time the bits are used is immaterial.
They can be kept and used until worn out, and even retipped, and the charge remains the san1e, so that the
charge made is actually for the wearing out of the bit.
(TRAP. 71).
In vie\\· of the foregoing, the cases cited by Davis
announcing the general Yiew that rental charges for
equipment are not lienable under the general1nechanic's
lien laws, are not applicable.
It should be noted that the two Kansas decisions
relied upon b:· Davis (lT'ilkinson r. Pacific 11lid-West
Oil Co. supra, and Brid.f!cport J!acl1ine Co. r. illcltnab,
supra) do not detennine the lienability of iteins such
as rock drilling bits, the practical utility of which is
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consumed so that there is a direct relationship between
the amount of the lien claim and the benefit conferred.
That said relationship is present here is evidenced by the
testimony of Davis' Witness Ed Karns that although it is
impossible to estimate exactly how many bits will be used
in a well there was nothing unusual about the fact that
the Driller used $4,158.64 worth of bits in drilling the well
in question. (TRB pp. 108-109).
In fact, the Kansas Court has indicated that the materials need not he completely consumed in allowing a
lien for the lumber used in the concrete forms in the
construction of a building even though they were removed and did not actually become a part of the building.
(Chicago Lumber Co. v. Douglas, 89 Kan. 308, 131 P.
563). The Court said in that case :
"Here the material was used in the erection
of the building, and it became temporarily a part
of the foundations of the building. Its use was
provided for in the plans for the building, and
was included in the contract of the parties. By
its use most of the material was destroyed or
rendered unfit for any other practical use. One
witness said that lumber so used became watersoaked, twisted, and practically valueless, and
that architects now generally provided in their
specifications that new lumber should be used
for such forms. Some of the thicker or dimension
lumber was not destroyed, and that much of it
was used for other purposes. For this a credit of
$88 was allowed. However, one of the contractors
said that they would have been as well off if they
had thrown it aside, and procured new lumber.
The material having been provided for in the
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contract, and having been used and practically
consumed in the erection of the building, can it be
held to be lienable under the law or can the surety
company be held liable for such material~
"In our opinion the authorities last cited
state the true rule of liability. The mechanic's
lien, although unknown to the common la\v, is
not to be given a narrow and strict construction.
It is intended as an enlargement of the rights of
those who furnish labor and material, and who
cannot conveniently protect themselves in any
other way. It is a general and remedial statute,
and the rule that statutes in derogation of the
common law shall be strictly construed does not
apply to it. Gen. Stat. 1909, 9850. On the contrary,
such statutes are to he liberally construed with a
view of advancing the beneficent purposes which
the Legislature was seeking to accomplish by
the enactment. Lumber Co. v. Water Co. 48 Kan.
182, 29 Pac. 476, 15 L.R.A. 652, 30 Aln. St. Re. 301.
A reasonable interpretation of our statutes, we
think, fairly includes the material used and consumed in the erection of the concrete walls. J._s
counsel for appellee says: 'This is coming to he
an age of concrete. Great Concrete buildings are
constantly being erected in all our cities. Several
thousands of dollars worth of lun1ber \\ill be
frequently used up for forn1s in the erection of
a single building. And architects and contractors
must include such lumber as specifications and
contracts as an inevitable part of the cost.' The
material in the forms furnished by appellee was
understood by all to be a necessary part of the
construction of the building. For a ti1ne these
fonns were an essential part of the walls, columns, and partitions. They were provided for in
the contract, and their character was included in
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the specifications. While the walls were hardening
they were as essential to the structure as the
cement and sand which remained in the walls in
a different form after the work was completed.
These forms operated to enhance the value of the
land on which they were used as did the labor in
setting them up. They were finally taken down
and removed, but the life and substance of the
material had been used up in the erection of the
building. The material cannot be regarded as a
part of the contractors' plant because it was impregnated with cement, and rendered practically
unfit for other uses. It was used directly in the
construction of the building, and, being consumed
in that use, it can be fairly said that within the
meaning of our statute it entered into and was
used in the erection of the building. It is clear
that it came within the terms of the bond as it was
'material furnished and used in and about said
contract work'." (Emphasis added)
The same could be said of the rock bits furnished
by Emsco in this case. After they were returned, they
were dull and their life and substance had been used up
in the drilling of the well. They were unfit for further
use as an instrument of drilling, and thus were practically consumed. They were certainly understood by all
to be an essential part of the drilling of the well.
STATEMENT OF POINT RELIED ON IN
CROSS APPEAL
POINT I
ONE WHO FURNISHES MATERIALS NECESSARY FOR
THE OPERATION OF A DRILLING RIG USED TO DRILL
AN OIL WELL IS ENTITLED TO A LIEN FOR THE VALUE
1
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OF THE MATERIALS FURNISHED UNDER SECTION 381-3 (Utah Code Annotated) 1953.
(a) LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY AND WORDING
STATUTES SUPPORT THIS CONCLUSION.

OF

(b) CASES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE
HELD THAT THESE MATERIALS ARE LIENABLE.
(c) THE UTAH LIEN STATUTES IS TO BE CON-

STRUED LIBERALLY TO EFFECT 'THE OBJE.CT
OF THE STATUTE.

ARGUI\IENT
POINT I
ONE WHO FURNISHES MATERIALS NECESSARY FOR
THE OPERATION OF A DRILLING RIG USED TO DRILL
AN OIL WELL IS ENTITLED TO A LIEN FOR THE VALUE
OF THE MATERIALS FURNISHED UNDER SECTION 381-3 (Utah Code Annotated) 1953.
(a) LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY AND WORDING
STATUTES SUPPORT THIS CONCLUSION.

OF

As with the question of transportation as set forth
in the Brief of Stanton in Case X o. 8951, the question
of the lienability of these ite1ns is one of first iiupression
in this State. The decision of the lower Court ·was that
these items were not lienable because they were part of
the drilling rig and the value for which the lien is claimed
was not consumed in the drilling of the well, but 1night
be used in other wells as well. (See TRB p. 114).
Emsco hereby incorporates by reference the section
of the brief of Stanton in Case No. 8951 with respect to
the legislative wording and history of the Statutes found
on pages 8 to 14 inclusive of said brief. It is submitted
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that the same broad construction claimed by Stanton
with respect to those "who shall do work for" the prospecting, development, preservation or working of an oil
well applies to those "who furnish matervals" for the
same purpose.
It should be noted that the difference in n1eanings
between the words "used ,in" found in the fore part of the
statute with respect to 1naterials furnished for in1provements on land and the words "for the prospecting, development, preservation or working" used with respect
to an oil well indicates that there is no requirements with
respect to an oil well that the materials be "used in" the
well, but only that they be furnished "for the prospecting,
development or working" of the well.

The materials in question were furnished for the
latter purpose and the well could not have drilled without
them.
(b) CASES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE
HELD THAT THESE MATERIALS ARE LIENABLE.

Inasmuch as there are no cases construing the Utah
Lien Statute with respect to this question, a discussion of
cases from other jurisdictions construing their particular
Statutes which are no more comprehensive in their purview than the Utah Statute is helpful.
The Oklahoma case of William M. Graham Oil and
Gas Co. v. Oil Well Supply, supra, holds that such items
are lienable. The material facts in that case as stated by
the court are as follows:
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"This account (of the lien claimant) had its
inception upon the application of one of the Lessees for a line of credit from this plaintiff whereunder materials, machinery and supplies were to
be furnished when and as required and needed by
the Lessees in the due course of the development
and improvement of their leaseholds. There was
no definite agreement upon the quantity of the
particular commodities, the total cost thereof, the
particular lease or leases to be developed, nor as
to the number of proposed wells, or other improvements with their location. The only definite understanding between the parties was that the Lessees
were the owners of leaseholds situated in Osagee
County, and that for the development thereof the
line of credit was granted."
After discussing other aspects of the case, the court
said:
"This brings us to the crux of the case, which
involves the application of Section 746-1, C.O.S.
1921, as it then existed, by "\Yhich the rights of the
parties must be measured, both as to the lienability of the many items constituting the accounts
and the rank to be accorded se\eral lien established thereunder. The relevant part of said section upon the first phase is as follows:
'Any person, corporation, or co-partnership,
who shall, under contract express or implied, with
the owner of an~~ leasehold for oil or gas purposes
or the owner of an~~ gas pipeline or oil pipeline or
with the trustee or agent of such owner. perform
labor or furnish Inaterials, InachinerY and oil well
supplies used in the digging, drilling, torpedoing,
completing, operating or repairing of any gas well,
shall have a lien upon the whole of such leasehold
or oil pipeline, or gas pipeline, or lease for oil and
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gas purposes, the buildings and appurtenances,
and upon the materials and supplies so furnished
and upon the oil or gas well for which they were
furnished, and upon all other oil or gas purposes
upon the leasehold for which said material and
supplies were furnished.'
"In this connection, our attention necessarily
is first directed to the meaning of the language
employed declaratory of the lien provided for.
Defendants urge the view that the word 'used' in
the phrase 'used in the digging, drilling, torpedoing, completing, operating, or repairing of any oil
or gas well,' constitutes a limitation upon the lienability of any items involved such as do not in fact
become a part of the equipment necessary for the
operation of the properties, either by consumption
or attachment, although they be essential instrumentalities in the process of both development and
operation....
"To follow defendants' contentions would
mean that the language of our statute must be
given a restricted or limited interpretation.
"The items here challenged consist of supplies
such as repairs for moveable personal property
usde by Lessees in improvement and operation
of properties, repair parts for truck, floor sweepers, snatch block bailer, wire and nails, padlocks,
oil cans, machine bolts, flash lights, hatchets, handles, hammer handles, wrench jaws, telegraph
cords, hammer, pipe reamer, bit gauge, manilla
cable, emery paper, files, scissors, flashlight batteries, spoke for tractor, cave watcher, water
buckets, barracks brooms, square, ax handle, augers, chisels, hand saw, drilling tools, parts for
drilling machine, drill cable, wire rope, bull rope,
soft wire line, punch, pulling machine, tube catcher
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and spudding shoe for use in development, operation and maintenance of the properties involved.
In our view, the language in the statute is not
susceptible of either a limited construction or application ''Tith respect to the challenged items, for
it is self-declaratory in that any labor, supplies,
materials, machinery, 'used' in the digging, drilling, torpedoing, completing or repairing of any
oil or gas well is comprehended and lienable. That
such items must become a part of the property
by either consumption or attachment is not the
basis of the law; it is the use thereof. The term
'used' in its common meaning and acceptation,
according to Lexicons means the employment of
the thing for the accomplishment of a particular
purpose. X o tenn of liLritation Y.Tas empbyed ~JY
the Legislature, if it was the intention that the
language of the statute was to have a restricted
interpretation. . . .

"'Ve also take judicial notice of the fact that
upon the ground of common knowledge that the
challenged ite1ns are essential and necessary supplies used in the develop1nent and operation of
properties in an industn- of the first magnitude,
which of itself, attracts the attention of capital
and invites and induces inveshnent of large sum5
of money, as was done in the case at bar.··
It is subnlitted that the Oklahmna rule is n10st consistent \Yith the broad 1neaning of the Utah Statute.
(c) THE

UTAH LIEN STATUTES IS TO BE CONSTRUED LIBERALLY TO EFFECT 'THE OBJECT
OF THE STATUTE.

For the sake of brevity. E1nsco incorporates herein
by reference the Section of the Brief of Stanton in Case
No. 8951 dealing "·ith this proposition at pages ~0 to 22.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectully submitted that the roek bits were
furnished under circumstances within the contemplation
of the Utah lien statute and the trial court did not err in
allowing Emsco a lien for the value of the use of those
bits in drilling the well in question in the sum of $4,158.64
and that the judgment of the trial court to that extent
should be affirmed. It is further submitted that the same
statute is broad enough to cover the other materials furnished by Emsco and the trial court did err in denying
the lien of Emsco for the balance of the materials furnished and the judgment of the trial court to that extent
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
ADA~IS & ANDERSON,
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Re~
spondents, Continental Emsco
Company, a divi·sion of
Youngstown Sheet and Tube
Company, a corporatvon.

.r.
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